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THE VULNERABILITY OF USING TAX
INCENTIVES IN WISCONSIN
BY VADA WATERS LINDSEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has gone through constant turmoil during the early
years of the millennium. The country has had to contend with financial
instability resulting from an unstable stock market, high unemployment and
war. The United States continues to lose employers and jobs to foreign
countries after the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement.'
More than three million jobs have been lost in the United States during the
last three years.2 Since March 2001, manufacturing jobs accounted for 90%
of all job losses.' Many jobs were lost to China, India, and Mexico.4 The
State of Wisconsin has not begun the millennium unscathed. The
unemployment level is high, and businesses are relocating from and
downsizing in Wisconsin at an alarming rate. The major newspaper in
Milwaukee regularly includes news stories reporting the loss of jobs and the
relocation of corporate headquarters. During November 2003, the Milwaukee
paper reported that since October 2000, Wisconsin had lost 84,000 jobs or
14% of its workforce. 5 In January 2004, Rayovac Corporation, a corporation
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A., Michigan State
University, 1983; J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 1988; LL.M, Georgetown University Law
Center, 1992. This author is grateful to have presented this Article at the Wisconsin Tax Policy
Colloquium, Marquette University Law School, April 15-16, 2004 and to have received helpful
comments from the participants. This author also wishes to thank Andrew Bridgman and Joseph M.
Freier for their valuable research assistance.
1. While the North American Free Trade Agreement has had negative impact, the United States
had valid reasons for entering into the agreement. According to Duke political science professor
Frederick W. Mayer, the United States agreed to negotiate the free trade agreement for three reasons:
Mexican stability was important, increased trade with Mexico would be beneficial, and a regional
agreement was necessary to counter the European Union. See FREDERICK W. MAYER,
INTERPRETING NAFTA (1998) (cited in Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Book Review, Getting to NAFTA:
A Review of Interpreting NAFTA by Frederick W. Mayer, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 330, 334 (1999)).
2. Anne Marie Chaker, Where the Jobs Are, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at D 1.
3. Dave Carpenter, Manufacturing Shift Sows Uncertainty; Productivity Gains, Asia Behind
Job Losses, CRI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2003, at N6.
4. Id.
5. Joel Dresang, Unemployment Rate Down: Unemployment Rate Down, but Manufacturing
Suffering, MtLW. J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2003, at 6D.
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founded in Madison in 1906, announced that it would relocate its corporate
headquarters from Madison, Wisconsin to Atlanta, Georgia.6 Wisconsin also
lost several additional major headquarters, including Kimberly-Clark, CNH
Global, and Fort Howard Corporation.
7
While much of the corporate downsizing and relocation can be attributed
to the general downturn in the United States economy as a whole,8 there are
several areas of the country that continue to have an influx of new businesses
and employment growth. In Lee County, Florida, for the fiscal year ending
June 2003, there was job growth by 9000 jobs or 4.6% because several
businesses located there.9 The strong Lee County job growth was attributable
to the low cost of conducting business, low housing costs, and the "absence of
an income tax."' 0 The job base in Texas has expanded in the technology
industry, and there has been an influx of corporate headquarters to
metropolitan Dallas. 1 The job base in Clark County, Nevada increased by
26,500 because its health care industry attracted the influx of pharmaceutical
and research companies. '
2
Of primary concern in this Article is the extent to which the State of
Wisconsin should utilize tax incentives to encourage businesses to relocate
and remain in Wisconsin. This Article will also explore the significance of
Wisconsin's maintaining an environment that promotes education. While it is
essential that Wisconsin retain a strong business base, that objective is
dependent on the presence of an educated and employable population. This
Article addresses whether it is more appropriate to promote both business
growth and education under direct expenditures programs.
This author has extolled the virtues of the federal government's use of tax
incentives to promote desired behavior.' 3 While Wisconsin generally follows
much of the federal law, it has decoupled from Congress's recent
6. Rick Romell, Rayovac Headquarters Heading for Atlanta: Battery, Shaver Maker Seeks
Closer Access to International Market, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2004, at ID.
7. Id.
8. During the last three years, the United States has lost over two million jobs. Chaker, supra
note 2, at D1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Reed Fujii, More People Leaving California than Moving in, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2004, at
C50.
12. Id.
13. See generally Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical
Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056 (2003) (stating "[w]hen used concurrently,
direct expenditures and tax incentives are an effective means of promoting charitable organizations");
Vada Waters Lindsey, The Burden of Being Poor: Increased Tax Liability? The Taxation of Self-
Help Programs, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 225 (1999) (stating that tax incentives can be effective
means of combating poverty and furthering other social programs).
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enhancement of some important tax incentives intended to spur the economy.
There are valid revenue constraints that states must consider in their decision
to decouple. Therefore, Wisconsin must be somewhat cautious in attempting
to attract and retain businesses and in subsidizing education. This Article will
explore the extent to which Wisconsin should promote both education and
business by enacting tax incentives or whether additional constraints
discourage their use and effectiveness at the state level to promote business
growth and education. Part II of this Article will examine the approach
Wisconsin uses in encouraging education. This part deals primarily with the
primary and secondary levels. This part will also examine Wisconsin's
"Milwaukee Parental Choice Program" and "Chapter 220 Program." Part II
also compares the Wisconsin approach to encourage education with the tax
incentive approach utilized in several states.
Part III of this Article explores Wisconsin's use of tax incentives and
direct expenditures to enhance business growth and stability. This part will
also examine the problems that Wisconsin has encountered in its attempt to
promote business growth. One of the major issues addressed is the
constitutional barriers associated with the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. This Article will outline the constitutional barriers that hinder the
adoption of particular state tax incentives. Finally, Part III of this Article will
consider additional barriers to the use of tax incentives as devices of
strengthening the local economy through business growth.
II. THE PROMOTION OF EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN
A. Promotion of Education Through Tax Incentives or Direct Expenditures
The economy has been generally weak during the last few years; however,
job opportunities are increasingly available for qualified workers in the areas
of health care, education, finance, and real estate.' 4 Education is an integral
component of establishing a strong base of employable and competent
workers in these industries as well as other industries. The National
Association of Colleges and Employers ("NACE") forecasts a 12.7% increase
in college graduate hires in the country, the first increase since 2001.15
Generally, college graduates earn higher wages than employees who lack a
collegiate education.16 In a recent study conducted by the Wisconsin Policy
14. Chaker, supra note 2, at DI.
15. Jane J. Kim, Graduates'Rosy Outlook Has Thorns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at 3D.
16. During 2001, the median income for workers possessing a Bachelor's degree was $49,985,
while the median income for high-school graduates was only $28,343. INCoME 2001, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income01/inctab7.html. Moreover, the median
2004]
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Research Institute ("WPRI"), it was determined that Milwaukee, Wisconsin's
largest city, has gone from being one of the nation's strongest economically to
one of the weakest.' 7 The study made the following observations:
Per capita income has fallen to 44th among the largest 50 cities.
[E]conomic success strongly correlates to educational
accomplishments, and... Milwaukee is far behind other cities on that
score. In 2000, they say, 18% of residents had college degrees,
compared with an average of 27% among the 50 largest cities. They
urge the city to increase the number of college graduates 5300 a year
through 2020 to reach the average.
Milwaukee's heritage as a blue-collar, working-class city is now
working against economic growth .... Today's successful cities have
a smaller blue-collar population and a higher proportion of their
residents with college degrees and creative abilities.'
8
If the WPRI study and NACE forecasts are accurate, Wisconsin must
increase the number of college graduates in Milwaukee. The percentage of
Wisconsin residents possessing at least a Bachelor's degree is below the
national average as well.' 9 During 2000, 22.4% of Wisconsin's population
possessed at least a Bachelor's degree, whereas the national average was
24.4%.20 To the extent that Wisconsin can subsidize education, the question
arises whether direct expenditures are a more effective means of subsidizing
education or whether tax incentives are more effective. Congress subsidizes
education under the Internal Revenue Code by granting credits,2' excluding
certain distributions that are used for tuition and related expenses, 22 and
allowing a deduction for student loan interest.23  Therefore, the Federal
income for high school dropouts was $19,434, and workers who have less than a 9th grade education
have an average median income of $14,594. Id.
17. Alan J. Borsuk, Economic Peril Weakening City; Study Stresses Need to Improve
Education, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 2004, at IA.
18. Id. (quotations omitted).
19. See Wisconsin Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/55000.html.
20. Id.
21. See IRC § 25A (2004) (granting Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits for tuition and related
expenses).
22. See, e.g., IRC § 529 (2004) (granting an exclusion for distributions from qualified tuition
programs maintained by states); IRC § 530 (2004) (providing exclusion for Coverdell education
savings account).
23. See IRC § 221 (2004) (allowing a deduction for up to $2500 for interest paid on students
loans for lower to middle income taxpayers). Of course, Congress also makes direct expenditures in
support of education.
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government uses tax incentives to promote education. In order to advance
Wisconsin's economic stability, the state needs to continue to provide
financial support from kindergarten through the collegiate level. Although
Wisconsin furthers education by use of tax incentives to encourage
education,24 it relies primarily on direct expenditures to promote education
and is one of the leaders in its establishment of school vouchers or school
choice 25 and promotes school integration under the "Chapter 220" program.
The Wisconsin Legislature enacted the "Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program' 26 as a mechanism of promoting education under a direct
expenditure format. Under a choice program, school vouchers may be used to
offset the tuition or related fees of a participating school of choice. Under the
choice program, any Milwaukee student from grade kindergarten through
twelve is subsidized in attending any private school located in Milwaukee if
all requirements are satisfied, including a requirement that the total family
income cannot exceed 175% of the poverty level.27 The Milwaukee choice
program caps the maximum percentage of district students who are allowed to
participate in the program at 1 5%.28 During the 2003-04 academic year, the
maximum voucher was $5882 per student.29 As of the official attendance
date for the current academic year, the total number of students in the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was 13,419, and these students were
enrolled in 106 Milwaukee private schools.30 The 14-year Milwaukee choice
program is the largest choice program in the country and costs the state
approximately $75 million annually. 31
In addition to the choice program, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the
Chapter 220 program during 1975 in order to promote voluntary cultural and
24. For example, Wisconsin provides a deduction up to $3000 for contributions to Wisconsin's
section 529 state program.
25. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Cleveland's school choice programs against an
Establishment Clause attack, holding that there was no violation where the parents have the
opportunity to choose between religious and nonreligious schools. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002). See also Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 ED.
L. REP. 1 (1997) (presenting a detailed review of constitutional provisions of each state in addressing
the likely outcome of litigation in state courts).
26. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2004). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also upheld
the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. See Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis.
2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998).
27. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (West 2004).
28. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(b) (West 2004).
29. Sarah Carr & Alan J. Borsuk, Committee Votes to Lift Enrollment Cap for Milwaukee
School Choice, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Oct. 16, 2003, at lB.
30. Id.
31. School Choices, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B6.
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racial integration in education.32 Under the Chapter 220 program, if a
"minority group pupil '33 resides in a school district where at least 30% of the
pupils enrolled in the school that the pupil would attend are also minority
group pupils, the pupil is able to attend a school in another school district
where members of that group constitute less than 30% of the students enrolled
at the selected school. 34 At its peak in 1993, there were 6503 participants in
the Chapter 220 program; however, the participation has generally declined
each year and during academic year 2002-03, there were only 4846
participants in the program. 35  According to a report issued by the Public
Policy Forum, the state paid $47 million to Milwaukee Public Schools and the
23 participating suburban districts during the 2000-01 academic year under
the Chapter 220 program.36
Other states have rejected the direct expenditure approach and adopted
tuition tax credits to encourage education.37 Florida allows for corporate tax
credits for donations to a tuition scholarship fund, and Pennsylvania allows
for corporate tax credits for donations to nonprofit organizations that provide
scholarships. 38 Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota have enacted individual tax
32. Russ Kava, School Integration (Chapter 220) Aid, Wis. LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU 1 (Jan.
2003) at www.schoolchoicewi.org.K12/detail.cfn?id=? [hereinafter School Integration (Chapter 220
Aid)].
33. A "minority group pupil" is defined as a pupil who is Black/African American, Native
American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian or Pacific Island origin and the pupil has reached the age of 4 on
or before September 1st during the year that the pupil enters school. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 121.845(2)
(2004).
34. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 121.85(2)(a) (West 2004).
35. See School Integration (Chapter 220 Aid), supra note 32, at 6.
36. Mike Johnson, Future of Chapter 220 in Jeopardy, at http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/
feb03/121762.asp.
. 37. There is very little consensus among scholars as to whether the use of school vouchers or
tax credits represents an acceptable method of promoting education. Compare Robinson, infra note
38, at 262 (stating that vouchers and tax credits are both government expenditures that "provide a
greater benefit to parents whose children attend private and religious schools, but at a cost of less
accountability than state and federal laws demand of public schools") with Avi Schick, Vouchers
Won't Give Families More Choice About Where Their Kids Go to School. Tax Credits Will, 2003
APR LEGAL AFF. 18 (2003) (arguing that school choice should be funded through tax credits rather
than school vouchers) and Stefani Carter, infra note 40, at 535 (stating although school tax credits
are imperfect, they are "a fast step in the right direction for the nation's troubled education system").
See also Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1999) (stating that school vouchers are no more
unconstitutional because payment is made to a sectarian school than Medicare payments to a
sectarian hospital); Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why
Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1105 (1997)
("Educational choice should not be limited to families of above average means who can afford the
high cost of private education.").
38. See Krista Kafer, School Choice in 2003: An Old Concept Gains New Life, 59 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 439, 448 (2003); Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits and Issues of
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credits for certain educational expenses. 39
B. Problems Associated with Using Tax Incentives to Encourage Education
Some proponents support the use of tax credits to subsidize and promote
education. One argument in support of tax credits is that the use of school tax
credits will broaden competition in schools because tax credits will empower
parents to penalize schools that are performing below par and force them to
become more competitive or fail.n° Proponents also argue that the grant of
school tax credits is an appropriate mechanism of relieving "double taxation"
for parents paying private school tuition and funding public schools through
property taxes.41
The United States Supreme Court upheld a state's allowance of tax
42deductions for education expenses more than 20 years ago. However, the
enactment of tax incentives in the form of either tax credits or tax deductions
cannot overcome undeniable policy constraints. One classic argument against
the use of tax incentives to encourage education is that it violates vertical and
horizontal equity.4 3 Horizontal equity is breached because similarly situated
taxpayers are not taxed similarly.a Taxpayers with similar income are not
taxed similarly if one taxpayer is eligible for the tax incentive but another
taxpayer is ineligible to receive the credit. Vertical equity is premised on the
notion that higher income taxpayers should bear a larger burden of the tax
liability based on an ability to pay concept.45 Where deductions or tax
incentives favor the wealthy, vertical equity is weakened. For example, if
lower income taxpayers do not have sufficient income to make a tax credit
beneficial, but the higher income taxpayers are able to claim the credit,
vertical equity is implicated.
To the extent that state legislatures enact educational tax credits, the
credits should resemble Minnesota's statutory provision. Under Minnesota's
tax scheme, the credit begins to phase out for taxpayers with income greater
Accountability and Equity, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 253 (2000).
39. See id
40. Stefani Carter, School Tax Credits, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 521, 525-26 (2002).
41. See Robinson, supra note 38, at 253-54 (citations omitted).
42. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
43. See Robinson, supra note 38, at 258.
44. In reference to the Hope credit, the Joint Committee on Taxation stated that the credit
violated horizontal equity, but equity should be relegated to a secondary consideration when social
goals are being addressed. See Robinson, supra note 38, at 258 (citing STAFF OF JOINT ECON.
COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL FOR A TUITION CREDIT 4 (Comm. Print
1997)).
45. Wisconsin implements vertical equity under its Constitution, which states that income taxes
may be imposed and those taxes may be graduated and progressive. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
2004]
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than $33,500 and is completely phased out for taxpayers with income
exceeding $37,500.4 6 The Minnesota provision solves two problems. The
phase-out of the credit beginning at $33,500 is consistent with the principles
of vertical equity. In addition, the credit is refundable; therefore, even if a
taxpayer lacks sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit, the tax
commissioner will refund any excess to the taxpayer.
47
A second constraint of using tax incentives to encourage education arises
even if the credit is refundable and vertically phases out. A tax incentive is
useless for lower income taxpayers because they invariably lack the requisite
resources to make educational expenditures for private school tuition and
other eligible educational expenditures. Consequently, the most significant
hurdle in the enactment of state tax credits to promote education is that many
lower to middle income taxpayers lack the immediate resources to permit
them to defray the ultimate costs associated with education-related expenses.
In such a case, vertical equity is violated because higher income taxpayers are
able to claim the credit, but in many cases lower income taxpayers are unable
to utilize the credit because they either lack tax liabilities or the immediate
resources needed to pay the education expenses.
Wisconsin's use of direct expenditure under its Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program and Chapter 220 Program does not result in the foregoing
equity constraints. However, Wisconsin's approach is not lacking in
controversy, particularly the voucher program. Consistent with public schools
in other major metropolitan cities, many of the Milwaukee public schools
have innumerable problems. One argument against the use of state taxpayer
dollars to defray private tuition expenses is that money should be used to
offset budgetary constraints in the public schools rather than merely
benefiting a few students attending private schools. 48 Some scholars oppose
the use of increasingly limited public dollars that had traditionally been used
to fund public schools to indirectly benefit private institutions. State taxpayer
dollars are used to defray tuition expenses for a small percentage of primary
and secondary students.49 The voucher program does not adequately address
the compelling need for Milwaukee to maximize educational opportunities for
a larger percentage of its residents to reverse the downward economic spiral
resulting from its dismal number of college graduates as compared to the
national average.
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.0674 (West 2003).
47. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.0674(2)(b) (West 2003).
48. Ellen M. Halstead, After Selman v. Simmons-Harris, School Voucher Programs Can
Exclude Religious Schools, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 153 (2004) (citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 163, 172 (2002) (citing numerous authorities criticizing the voucher programs).
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In addition, opponents urge the dismantling of the choice program because
of inadequate regulatory control over the participating schools. Recently, the
Wisconsin Legislature took steps to assuage some of these concerns by
enacting new regulatory rules and making the participating private schools
more accountable. Under the new rules, the private school must submit an
independent financial audit to the State Department of Public Instruction. 50 In
addition, a participating school must provide a copy of its current certificate
of occupancy, evidence of financial viability, and proof that the school
administrator had participated in a fiscal management training program. 51
Finally, the state superintendent may bar a private school from participating in
the program if it fails to comply with these provisions or presents "an
imminent threat to the health or safety of pupils. ' '52 The Department of Public
Instruction exercised its authority under these newly created rules to bar two
problematic schools from further participation in the choice program.53
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and the Chapter 220 Program
have not reversed the disturbing educational disparities between the races.
While Wisconsin had an impressive statewide high school graduation rate of
91.8%, the graduation rate for Blacks or African-Americans was a woeful
62.9%. 54 Another compelling statistic that exemplifies the disparity between
African-American students and other students in the state is the ACT college
entrance exam ranking. For the seventh year in a row, Wisconsin's average
composite score of 22.2 was the highest among states where at least 40% of
high school students took the test.55 Conversely, the average composite score
for African-American students was 17.1, much lower than the Wisconsin state
average.56  Most of Wisconsin's African-American students reside in
Milwaukee. As a result, based on the below-par ACT composite scores and
graduation rate for African-Americans, there is a strong argument that
Wisconsin's approach to educating African-Americans, including the choice
and Chapter 220 programs, is unsuccessful. However, the programs do, in
fact, provide participants choices of alternative educational placement that
might not have otherwise existed. Moreover, some of the problems that exist
50. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1 19.23(7)(am) (West 2004).
51. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(d) (West 2004).
52. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(a)-(b) (West 2004).
53. Sarah Carr, State Bumps Two Schools in Milwaukee from Choice Program, MILW. J.
SENTINEL, July 15, 2004, at Al.
54. Amy Hetzner, Teacher Data Shows Discrepancy; State has more who are 'Highly
Qualified' than are Fully Licensed, MaLw. J. SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2004, at 1B.
55. Sarah Carr, State Earns Highest ACT Scores; Wisconsin has Ranked in Top Spot for 7
Consecutive Years, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 2003, at 3B.
56. Id.
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in Milwaukee's education system are the result of sociological and cultural
issues, involving poverty, teen pregnancy, and drugs. Consequently, until
those issues are resolved, Milwaukee will have difficulty reversing the
negative empirical data, whether it relies on tax incentives or direct
expenditures.
In comparing the two direct expenditure approaches employed in
Wisconsin, the Chapter 220 program represents a better use of the state's tax
dollars. First, the tax dollars are not being diverted from public schools to
private schools. Second, there is no threat of an Establishment Clause
challenge. Third, the Chapter 220 Program's objective of integration is
becoming more important as the general population become more diverse.
Finally, the state is able to exert more regulatory control over the public
schools than private schools because of the constitutional limitations.
III. WISCONSIN'S USE OF BUSINESS TAx INCENTIVES
A. In General
The starting point for determining a Wisconsin taxpayer's tax liability is
the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income. Wisconsin diverges in many
respects from the federal law; consequently, Wisconsin requires certain
additions and subtractions from the federal adjusted gross income to account
for these differences. Several of these differences are based on Wisconsin's
decision to decouple from many tax incentives that are incorporated in the
Internal Revenue Code. The United States Congress routinely enacts tax
incentives to encourage desired behavior. Many of these tax incentives are
intended to spur the economy. While the use of tax incentives complicates the
Internal Revenue Code, Congress continues to rely on them in conjunction
with its use of direct expenditures. For example, under the Jobs and Growth
Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003, Congress made substantial changes to section
179, which allows for a current deduction for the purchase of tangible
personal property.57 Under the Act, Congress temporarily increased the
deduction from a maximum deduction of $25,000 to $100,000. The section
179 deduction is phased out to the extent that the tangible personal property
acquired during the taxable year exceeds a threshold amount. Under the Act,
Congress increased the phase-out threshold from $200,000 to $400,000.
Finally, Congress included off-the-counter software as qualifying property.
While Wisconsin allows the section 179 deduction, Wisconsin declined to
57. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 § 202, 26 U.S.C. § 179 (2003).
[88:107
TAX INCENTIVES IN WISCONSIN
adopt the 2003 Congressional changes that maximized the tax incentive.58
Wisconsin's decision to decouple its treatment of section 179 from the federal
law saved the state a substantial amount of lost revenue.
Wisconsin also declined to adopt the IRC § 168 special depreciation rules
that Congress enacted under both the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act
of 2002 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003. In order to
"promote capital investment, modernization, and growth" and "spur an
economic recovery," Congress enacted an additional first-year depreciation
deduction of 30% of the depreciable basis for qualified property acquired after
September 10, 2001 under the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of
2002.59  For property acquired after May 5, 2003, Congress enacted an
additional first-year depreciation deduction of 50% under the Jobs and
Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003.60 The State of Wisconsin decoupled
its depreciation system from the 30% and 50% federal bonus depreciation
amounts.
Similar to the section 179 election, Wisconsin's decision to decouple from
the federal government's bonus depreciation reduced the prospect of a
revenue shortfall. While the revenue impact on Wisconsin is unclear, the
Center on Budget and Policy Properties estimated that state revenues would
be reduced by $14.1 billion during the years that the 30% additional
depreciation were applicable if all states conformed to the federal law. 61
Conversely, an argument against Wisconsin's decoupling from the
amendments to the section 179 election and the section 168 bonus
depreciation would be that taxpayers would invest in more tangible personal
property used in the trade or business and depreciable property, resulting in
expansion of business operations and increased revenue stream for the state.
Hence, based on this line of reasoning, the statutory changes would result in a
tax break for business owners, but the additional revenue resulting from the
business growth would offset its cost.
While Wisconsin decoupled from the Congress's latest round of tax
savings, Wisconsin does rely on tax incentives to subsidize business activities.
The primary question to be considered herein is whether tax incentives add
value in Wisconsin or whether the state should rely primarily on direct
58. See News for Tax Practitioners, at http://www.dor.state.wi.us/taxpro/news.html.
59. Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 107th
Congress 218 (CCH 2003).
60. If a taxpayer claims the 50% additional depreciation for qualified property, the taxpayer is
not able to claim the 30% additional depreciation for the same property. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Conference Report 18-19 (CCH 2003).
61. Breaking Up is Hard to Do: States Respond to Federal Bonus Depreciation, at http:www.
taxadmin.org/fta/rate/decoupling/tan-art.html.
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expenditures to further economic growth, stability, and employment. The
previous section considered whether tax incentives should be employed in
Wisconsin to further education. This section addresses whether Wisconsin
should adopt tax policies to compete with other states in persuading
businesses to locate some operations in Wisconsin or in encouraging existing
business operations to remain in the state.
B. The Role of Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Businesses in
Wisconsin
States routinely compete with other states in encouraging businesses to
locate to and remain in their states. One of the earliest uses of tax incentives
to induce a business to relocate to a particular state occurred during 1791 in
persuading Alexander Hamilton to locate his manufacturing plant in New
Jersey.62 Since that time, the amount of state money devoted to that endeavor
has skyrocketed. It is estimated that states spend approximately $30 billion
per year in competing for businesses. 63 The competition is not merely to
encourage businesses to relocate to the state but also to remain in the state.
Some of the frequently used tax incentives are tax credits, depreciation, and
property tax exemptions. For example, during the 1990s, Cytec Industries,
Inc., received $19 million in local property tax abatements from Louisiana
during a 10-year period. 64 The nontax incentives include cash grants, free or
discounted real property, employee training and relocation assistance, and
infrastructure improvements.65 Consistent with other states, Wisconsin has
sacrificed tax revenue to subsidize business activities. Wisconsin exempts
from property taxes machinery and equipment used in manufacturing. During
2001, approximately $12.5 billion of the equipment was exempted from
taxation.66  Under certain circumstances, Wisconsin also exempts
manufacturing machinery and equipment from sales and use tax, resulting in a
reduction of such taxes of approximately $240 million for Fiscal Year 2000.67
62. Andrew L. Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions
Stimulate Economic Development, 44 TAX LAW. 285 (1990) (citing Bernstein, States Are Going
Down Industrial Policy Lane, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 1984, at 112).
63. Vicki Been, "'Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 473, 513-14 (1991) (citations omitted).
64. Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Constraints on
State Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 847, 855
(1999).
65. Michael Bourn, Corporate Incentives: Sweetening the Site Selection Deal, 16 WORLD
TRADE 46 (2003).
66. Pamela Walgren, State Tax Incentives for Economic Development in Wisconsin, WIS.
DEP'T OF REV., Div. OF RESEARCH & POL'Y, Jan. 30, 2003, at 9.
67. Walgren, supra note 66, at 11.
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In order to encourage corporate research and development, Wisconsin follows
the federal law and grants a nonrefundable credit for certain research
conducted in the state, resulting in $32 million of tax credits for 1999.68 As
Wisconsin attempts to forge a recovery from the recent recession, it is
inevitable that Wisconsin will continue relying on tax incentives to promote
business growth and stability. The following section will examine the
problems Wisconsin faces as it competes for businesses and strives for
economic stability.
C. Problems Associated with the Use of Tax Incentives
1. Constitutional Barriers
Every tax scheme must be sustained against constitutional attacks based
on the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. While the courts have
adjusted their analyses over the years, Wisconsin tax schemes have been
subjected to constitutional attacks for generations. 69 As will be discussed,
there is an equal protection component to the Commerce Clause analysis
because the statute must not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Wisconsin tax measures must also withstand equal protection attacks
independent of the Commerce Clause. The constitutionality of a statutory
provision is a question of law,70 and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has long
held that where a tax measure is at issue, there is a strong presumption of
constitutionality.
71
a. Equal Protection Attacks
A state tax measure will be considered valid under an equal protection
analysis unless there are apparent gross misclassifications.72 The standard that
68. Walgren, supra note 66, at 3.
69. See, e.g., U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918) (holding that
assessment under Wisconsin general income tax upon Wisconsin corporation was not a sufficient
burden on interstate commerce to affect an unconstitutional interference); State ex rel. Borden Co. v.
Dammann, 198 Wis. 265, 224 N.W. 139 (1929) (striking down a statute that required the payment of
a tax on authorized capital stock for violating the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses); State v.
Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468 (1904) (addressing whether statute that exempted some
businesses and individuals from licensing fee was a tax or an exercise of the police power and
whether it was a violation of equal protection of the laws).
70. GTE Sprint Communications Co. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 155 Wis. 2d 184, 192, 454 N.W.2d
797, 800(1990).
71. See Simanco, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 57 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 203 N.W.2d 648, 651
(1973).
72. Id. at 55, 203 N.W.2d at 652. According to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, "a legislature
has much more leeway in granting exemptions in taxation measures than it does in regulatory
measures under its police power without running athwart of equal protection of the laws clause of the
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the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applies in determining the constitutionality
of tax measures under an equal protection analysis is whether the
"classification is arbitrary and has no reasonable purpose or relationship to the
facts or a justifiable and proper state policy. '73 The states have broad power
to make classifications in the areas of economic and fiscal regulation in order
to achieve reasonable state policies.74 The burden of proof is on the party
challenging the legislative enactment.75 The Equal Protection Clause of the
Wisconsin Constitution is substantially equivalent to the United States
Constitution; therefore, courts construe the Wisconsin Constitution as
affording the same protections as those under the United States Constitution. 6
In Simanco, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,77 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin addressed the constitutionality of an amendment to section
71.337(1)78 of the Wisconsin Statutes. That section permitted nonrecognition
of gain or loss to liquidating corporations resulting from the sale or exchange
of their property. Section 71.337(1) was enacted to comport with Internal
Revenue Code § 337.79 Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code permits
nonrecognition treatment to a liquidating corporation for property distributed
to a parent corporation. Congress enacted section 337 to prevent double
taxation.80 The nonrecognition provision under Wisconsin law was made
inapplicable to the extent that nonresidents participated in the distribution of
assets because the risk of double taxation would not exist. The state would
lose substantial revenue resulting from its inability to tax the corporation, as
well as the nonresident shareholder, upon the redemption of their stock.81
In Simanco, a corporation argued that the classification under the
Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that
the classification did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 82 because the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Hillside Transit Co. v. Larson, 265 Wis. 568, 583, 62 N.W.2d
722, 730 (1954)).
73. Simanco, 57 Wis. 2d at 57, 203 N.W.2d at 653 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 54-57, 203 N.W.2d at 652-53 (citations omitted).
75. Just v. Marinette Co., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (cited in Simanco, 57 Wis. 2d
at 54, 203 N.W.2d at 651).
76. GTE Sprint Communications Co. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 155 Wis. 2d 184, 193, 454 N.W.2d
797, 801 (1990).
77. 57 Wis. 2d 47, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973).
78. Section 71.337(1) was subsequently repealed and replaced by section 71.23.
79. Simanco, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 57 Wis. 2d 47, 51, 203 N.W.2d 648, 650 (1973).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 51-53, 203 N.W.2d at 650-51.
82. Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that section 71.337(1) did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, the court of appeals concluded that it violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in certain circumstances. See Polan v. Dep't of Revenue, 147 Wis. 2d 648, 433 N.W.2d 640
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classification was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 83 If all shareholders were
Wisconsin residents, Wisconsin would be able to tax the gain realized by the
shareholders. To the extent that the shareholders were all nonresidents, the
State of Wisconsin would be unable to tax the corporation without the
statutory classification nor would the state be able to tax any of the
shareholders on gain realized. The state had valid reasons for enacting the
classification in order to achieve reasonable economic and fiscal state
policies.
84
Conversely, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that a state retail
sales tax that the state imposed upon the transfer of local access telephone
services of interexchange telecommunications, but not of local exchange
carriers and transfers of access services to resellers, was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause. 85  The Wisconsin Legislature enacted
section 77.51(m) to offset anticipated revenue shortfalls resulting from a
Department of Revenue ruling that exempted interexchange carriers, local
exchange carriers, and resellers from the payment of taxes for the purchase of
access services.86 According to the court, the imposition of the tax only upon
the interexchange carriers was arbitrary and unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. Unlike the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Simanco, the
court in GTE Sprint Communications did not find any substantial distinction
between the different categories of carriers. In Simanco, there existed a
rational basis for disparate treatment; however, no such basis existed in GTE
Sprint Communications. As indicated by the court in Simanco, the loss of
revenue represents a valid purpose for a tax. However, in GTE Sprint
Communications, the court concluded that there was no valid reason why the
(Ct. App. 1988). In Polan, the court concluded that section 71.337(1) violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution because of the state's discriminatory treatment of
nonresidents where the shareholders sustained a loss, the only shareholders were nonresidents, and
the corporation had a loss. Id. at 661-62, 433 N.W.2d at 645-46.
83. Id. at 653, 433 N.W.2d at 642.
84. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has found other classifications to be valid under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Midcontinent Broadcasting Co. of Wis. v. Dep't of Revenue, 98 Wis. 2d
379, 297 N.W.2d 191 (1980) (upholding the imposition of sales tax where taxpayer held a sales
permit because administrative convenience was a sufficient justification to an equal protection
attack); Moebius Printing Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 89 Wis. 2d 610, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979)
(rejecting commercial printer's claim that the imposition of the sales tax on printed material,
combined with the exclusion of the use tax on materials retained in the state for subsequent use solely
outside the state gave businesses the incentive to purchase outside of the state); Hillside Transit Co.
v. Larson, 265 Wis. 568, 62 N.W.2d 722 (1954) (finding equal protection challenge to exemptions to
a ton-mile tax constitutional because the legislature is authorized to use exemptions to help certain
industries economically).
85. GTE Sprint Communications Co. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 155 Wis. 2d 184, 189-91, 454 N.W.2d
797, 799 (1990).
86. Id. at 195, 454 N.W.2d at 802.
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tax should be imposed on some purchases but not others.
b. Commerce Clause Violations
Under the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, a
state taxing statute will be invalidated if it burdens interstate commerce and
therefore interferes with Congress's authority to regulate commerce among
the states. 87  The United States Supreme Court set forth a four-part test in
determining whether a tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause. A tax will
be upheld if it is applied to an activity with a "substantial nexus" to the taxing
state, is fairly apportioned, relates to the services provided by the taxing state,
and does not discriminate against interstate commerce.88 The purpose of state
taxation on interstate commerce is to ensure that the interstate commerce
contributes "a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection
it enjoys. 89
A Wisconsin circuit court recently addressed whether a tax exemption
87. Midcontinent Broadcasting Co. of Wis., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 98 Wis. 2d 379, 394, 297
N.W.2d 191, 199 (1980).
88. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (cited in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, No. 02-CV-3533 (CCH) 400-731 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7,
2003)). This Article addresses only the discrimination prong of the commerce clause analysis. There
are countless Wisconsin cases that address the other prongs. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v.
State, 205 Wis. 2d 494, 556 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that hazardous materials
transportation fee invalid under the commerce clause because it violated the apportionment prong of
the standard); United Parcel Service Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 204 Wis. 2d 63, 73, 553 N.W.2d
861, 865 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding an apportionment formula is unconstitutional when it is established
by "'clear and cogent evidence' that the income attributed to the state is in fact 'out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted in that state' or has 'led to a grossly distorted result'); Am. Tel.
Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 143 Wis. 2d 533, 422 N.W.2d 629 (Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that
apportionment formula applied to interstate public utility violated due process and commerce clauses
because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the utility's in-state activities); Nat'l Liberty Life
Ins. Co. v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 347, 369, 215 N.W.2d 26, 37 (1974) (finding general revenue tax
imposed on out-of-state mail order insurer found unconstitutional because it was an unapportioned
tax); Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 14 Wis. 2d 377, 111 N.W.2d 148
(1961) (stating that fairly apportioned taxes do not unduly burden the commerce clause). Other
jurisdictions apply similar constitutional analysis in determining whether a tax violates the commerce
clause. See, e.g., Simon Aviation, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 805 N.E.2d 920, 929 (Ind.
2004) (holding that Indiana's use tax placed a greater burden on aircraft purchased out-of-state than
aircraft purchased in-state and impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce); Bulkmatic
Transp. Co. v. Dep't of State Revenue, 715 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. 1999) (holding that special tax
exemption for fuel had an effect of making it cheaper to operate certain in Indiana than out-of-state
and therefore violated the interstate commerce because it was discriminatory); Scholastic Book
Clubs, Inc. v. State, 567 N.W.2d 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that Michigan's imposition
of use tax against out-of-state company for its use of Michigan teachers to take book orders from
taxpayer's catalogs violated commerce clause because of insufficient nexus).
89. Nat'l Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 347, 354, 215 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1974) (citing
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253-54 n.7 (1946)).
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from both ad valorem and property taxes for air carriers operating hub
facilities in Wisconsin violated the Commerce Clause. 90 Air carriers that did
not operate hub facilities in Wisconsin were subject to an ad valorem tax in
lieu of a property tax. Northwest Airlines challenged the constitutionality of
the exemption on several bases, including interstate commerce and equal
protection grounds. 91 The basis of the interstate commerce claim was that the
exemption discriminated against interstate commerce. While it is not
unconstitutional for a state to tax dissimilar businesses differently, the state
cannot tax similar businesses dissimilarly. Businesses are not dissimilar for
purposes of the analysis based solely on the amount of business conducted in
Wisconsin.92  Moreover, under the statutory provision, the airline had to
maintain its company headquarters in Wisconsin in order to qualify for the
exemption. The circuit court found that the provision "patently violate[d]" the
commerce clause because the business would clearly be disadvantaged if it
chose to maintain its corporate headquarters outside of the State of
Wisconsin.93 The Wisconsin Department of Revenue appealed the adverse
decision.
The recent invalidation of Wisconsin's tax incentives favoring air carriers
operating hub facilities was not the first occasion that tax incentives targeted
at in-state businesses had been determined to violate the Commerce Clause.
For example, in Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,94
the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission invalidated section 71.04(15)(b) of
the Wisconsin Statutes, an accelerated depreciation provision restricted to in-
state facilities, because it discriminated against interstate commerce.95
Similarly, in Burlington Northern, Inc. v. City of Superior,96 the
Wisconsin Legislature had imposed an occupational tax equal to 5% per ton
of all iron ore concentrates handled by and over docks.9 7 The tax was
imposed on operators of iron ore concentrate docks, but the statutory scheme
90. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, No. 02-CV-3533 (CCH) 400-731
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2003).
91. During 2000 through 2002, the plaintiff, Northwest Airlines, paid approximately $1.5
million on an ad valorem basis each year. Conversely, although Midwest Express paid
approximately $1.95 million in ad valorem taxes during 2000, the airline did not have any taxes due
during 2001 and 2002 resulting from the statutory exemption. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Nos. 91-1-100-102, 1993 WL 57202, at 3 (cited in Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from
Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv.
377, 437 (1996)).
95. Id.
96. 131 Wis. 2d 564, 388 N.W.2d 9i6 (1986).
97. Id. at 570, 388 N.W.2d at 919.
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exempted iron ore concentrates mined in Wisconsin and handled over the
docks. During the period from 1977 to 1980, iron ore concentrates mined in
Minnesota by various steel producers passed through Burlington Northern's
docks in the city of Superior and were loaded on barges to be carried to
various ports and steel mills located outside of Wisconsin.98 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin noted that a state tax was not "per se invalid" simply
because it burdened interstate commerce, but a state was unauthorized to
indiscriminately tax conduct that constituted interstate commerce. 99 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the state tax was unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause because the statute provided a commercial advantage to
local businesses at the expense of out-of-state miners.100 According to the
court, the fact that the legislature intended to aid in-state mining rather than to
hamper out-of-state miners was not a relevant criterion because the
determination was based on either discriminatory effect or purpose.
10 1
Consequently, Wisconsin must exercise great care in promoting Wisconsin
businesses while not infringing on interstate commerce.
2. Political Fallout
The State of Wisconsin is one of the most heavily taxed states in the
country. One of the reasons that Wisconsin's tax burden is traditionally
higher than other states is that the state and local governments rely more
heavily on taxes rather than fees. As documented by Professor Andrew
Reschovsky, when comparing Wisconsin with other states, Wisconsin ranks
above the average state in tax levies but below average on fees and charges,
such as automobile registration and public recreation fees.102 For 2002, more
than one-third of state and local tax revenue is derived from property taxes,
and the state's property tax revenue is above the national average. 0 3 Most of
the property tax revenue is derived from residential property. 104 Most of the
state tax revenue is from sales and individual income taxes. For example,
during 2003, sales taxes constituted 30.7% and individual income taxes
98. Id. at 571, 388 N.W.2d at 919-20.
99. Id. at 575, 388 N.W.2d at 921.
100. Id. at 576, 388 N.W.2d at 921.
101. Id. at 578, 388 N.W.2d at 923-24.
102. See Andrew Reschovsky, The Taxpayer Bill of Rights: A Solution to Wisconsin's Fiscal
Problems or a Prescription for Future Fiscal Crises?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 135 (2004).
103. 2002 State Local Tax Collection by Source, at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
slsource.html.
104. Although the data is unavailable for fiscal year 2003, for fiscal year 2002, 68.8% of the
total property taxes involved residential property, defined as single-family and multifamily housing
with no more than eight units. Wis. DEP'T OF REV., Div. OF RESEARCH & POL'Y, State and Local
Taxes in Wisconsin 5 (2002), at http://www.dor.state.wi.us/ra/proptx02.pdf.
[88:107
TAX INCENTIVES IN WISCONSIN
constituted 43.1% of state taxes. 0 5 Conversely, the corporate income tax for
2003 accounted for only 4.3% of the total state taxes collected during the
year.10 6 The corporate income taxes collected by all 50 states ranged from
zero to 20.2%, and the average corporate tax was 5.2%.107 Wisconsin's
corporate tax was only slightly below the average; however, a different result
occurred when comparing the individual income tax. Wisconsin ranked
eighth when compared to the total tax revenue collected under the individual
income taxation. 1
08
There are several conceivable justifications for the relatively low
percentage of corporate tax in relation to other forms of revenue. According
to Wisconsin Department of Revenue estimates, while there are
approximately 107,000 Wisconsin corporations, 51,000 of them are
subchapter S corporations, pass-thru entities not subject to double-taxation.j 9
Hence, almost 50% of Wisconsin corporations are not subject to tax at the
corporate level, and all items of income are taxed at only the investor level.
Other forms of business, including sole proprietorships, limited liability
companies, and partnerships, tax income at the investor level only.
Consequently, some of the individual income tax is attributable to business
income. The reality, however, is that other states also tax income derived
from subchapter S corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and
sole proprietorships only at the investor level, but Wisconsin still ranks below
other states in the percentage of its total tax revenue that is derived from the
corporate tax.
The empirical data establishes that the percentage of revenue attributable
to state individual taxes in Wisconsin exceeds the national average, but the
revenue attributable to corporate income taxes is below par. For this reason,
Wisconsin is not in the position to rely on additional tax incentives that could
exacerbate the disparity. Politically, it would be difficult to justify corporate
tax breaks while the percentage of revenue collected from individuals is above
the national figures and the percentage collected from corporations is below
average. Moreover, any decrease in the corporate income taxes would
necessitate an increase in some other taxes.
During 2003, there were four states that did not have corporate income
105. 2003 State & Local Taxes by Source, at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/03taxdis.htmil.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Pamela Walgren, State Tax Incentives for Economic Development in Wisconsin, WIS.
DEP'T OF REv., Div. OF RESEARCH & POL'Y 2 (Apr. 20,2004), at http://www.dor.state.wi.us/ra/
incent04.pdf.
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taxes, but they also did not impose individual income taxes."10 In all four
jurisdictions that lacked both individual and corporate taxes, their percentage
of revenue derived from the general sales tax was generally greater than the
average of all states."' Converselyj Wisconsin's revenue collected from the
general sales tax was generally lower than the national average.'' 2  If
Wisconsin lowered the tax on businesses by enacting additional tax
incentives, it is probable that some other tax would be increased, such as the
general sales tax, to account for revenue shortfalls. An increase in the general
sales tax would necessarily result in increased regressivity. Low- to middle-
income residents spend a larger portion of their income on consumables and
are unable to invest much money in capital investments. On the other hand,
higher income individuals are able to invest a higher percentage of their
income in long-term investments and spend a lower percentage on
consumables. An increase in fees and other charges would have the same
result.
This conclusion is not altered by the fact that Wisconsin's use of tax
incentives to promote business growth would subsidize other forms of
business. The use of tax incentives to spur business development would
lower the tax liabilities of incorporated and unincorporated businesses. The
obvious impact of the business tax incentives would be to lower the tax
liability of the more affluent Wisconsin taxpayers. If this reduction resulted
in an influx or retention of business operations in Wisconsin without an
increase in other taxes and fees, it would be an effective use of tax policy.
However, if the business tax incentives do not increase tax revenue by
spurring the economy, the lowered business tax revenue would need to be
offset by increased taxes or fees and, in all probability, increased regressively.
3. Ineffective Long-Term Benefits of Location Incentives
Many academics do not believe that tax incentives induce businesses to
locate in a particular state." 3  Professor Richard Pomp is a well-known
proponent of supporting the elimination of states' use of tax incentives to lure
businesses to their states." 4 Professor Pomp outlined 10 reasons why state tax
110. These states are Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Matthew T. Furton, The Use of Penalty Clauses in Location Incentive Agreements, 70
IND. L.J. 1009, 1015 (1995) (citations omitted). But see Andrew L. Kolesar, Note, Can State and
Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stimulate Economic Development?, 44 TAX LAW.
285, 292 (1990) (stating that "tax policy and tax incentives may affect the location decision because
direct taxes on businesses lower the rate of return on that investment").
114. Richard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Business:
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incentives were an ineffective means of stimulating business and attracting
businesses to locate to a state. 15 The factors that are particularly compelling
are: 1) other costs associated with business operations greatly exceed state and
local taxes; 2) state and local taxes are deductible at the federal level thereby
reducing the after-tax impact of state tax incentives; 3) the value of tax
incentives, such as property tax abatements, may be reduced by lower
property values in the state;" 6 and 4) state and local taxes fund services
important to businesses, including education and improved infrastructure." 7
Another significant problem that states have encountered is their inability
to prevent businesses from relocating after benefiting from both direct and tax
incentives. For example, during 1992 the city of Ypsilanti, Michigan,
unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin General Motors from closing an assembly
plant after it had received $13.5 million in property tax abatements." 8 There
is a substantial amount of empirical data establishing that states lose revenue
when they use location incentives because the businesses relocate from the
state before any long-term benefits can be realized. A state's use of location
incentives to remain competitive with other states can actually jeopardize the
state's economic stability. Legal scholars refer to this course of action as the
"race to the bottom."'' 19
Finally, Wisconsin's use of tax incentives represents a costly and
ineffective method of encouraging businesses to relocate and remain in the
state. It would be difficult for Wisconsin to recoup location incentives
because state businesses might relocate to other states before any return on its
investment could be materialized. Therefore, Wisconsin should be leery
about relying too heavily on tax incentives to spur economic development.
This is particularly true where Wisconsin utilizes tax incentives because,
A View from New York, 29 TAx NoTES 521 (Nov. 4, 1985).
115. See id. at 522-25.
116. But see J. Foster Clark, Chairman, Alabama's Existing Constitutional Provisions
Impacting Economic Development: A Report by the Technical Advisors Committee for Economic
Development, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 513, 529 (2003) ("Even though Alabama has low property taxes,
exemption from property taxes can itself be useful in attracting new business, and so these provisions
are worthy of consideration for that reason alone."); Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The
Insufficiency of Current Constraints on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative
Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1999) (outlining representations made by a corporate
official, where the corporation was receiving property tax abatements, that Louisiana's tax is "above
average" for southern states and without the abatement, the state would not have been able to
compete with those other southern states).
117. See Pomp, supra note 114.
118. Furton, supra note 113, at 1010-11 (citing Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506
N.W.2d 556, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
119. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves, Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 380 (1996).
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unlike direct incentives, the true cost is often concealed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin needs to continue attracting and retaining business ventures in
the state. It must also work diligently to promote education from elementary
school through the collegiate level. Both of these objectives are instrumental
to maintaining economic stability. While Wisconsin utilizes tax incentives to
encourage education under its section 529 program, its voucher program-a
direct expenditure program-is one of the leading choice programs in the
country. The program has its flaws, but it does not pose the numerous
problems that exist under a tax incentives program. The state also promotes
educational integration under the Chapter 220 program by providing state
funds to encourage schools to desegregate. To gauge the success of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and Chapter 220 program, studies need
to be conducted to objectively evaluate the programs' effectiveness.
Empirical data need to be compiled following objective criteria: high school
graduation rates of participants in the programs, composite ACT and SAT
entrance exam scores, and college graduation rates. 
12 0
With respect to business growth, the federal government's use of tax
incentives does not pose the numerous problems that result when the states
rely too heavily on them to spur the economy by granting tax incentives.
There is no guarantee that tax incentives are nothing more than a windfall to
the intended beneficiaries. There is support for the argument that businesses
are more concerned with issues such as infrastructure and schools. There are
constitutional constraints that might invalidate the tax incentive. The amount
of loss in revenue is difficult to project when the state uses tax incentives to
encourage businesses to relocate or remain in the state as compared to direct
expenditures. There are no guarantees that the state is able to recoup the lost
revenue if the business subsequently relocates to another state. Finally, any
reduction of business taxes will result in an increase of some other form of
taxation, such as the sales tax. The consequence of an increase in the general
sales tax is a corresponding increase in regressivity.
120. It is important for the empirical data to be thorough and objective. A recent study
conducted by a conservative think tank concluded that the graduation rate of students graduating
from private high schools under the voucher program was significantly higher than the overall
graduation rate of students attending Milwaukee Public Schools. Alan J. Borsuk, Graduation Rates
Under Choice Higher, Study Says, MILW. J. SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 2004, at lB. However, the sample
included only 10 private high schools receiving funding under the voucher program. In order to
assess the success of the program, all students participating in the voucher program must be
compared with those attending the Milwaukee Public Schools,
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